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ABSTRACT
Raytheon - Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) manufactures surface radars. In the past,
Raytheon's Andover plant was primarily a systems integration facility receiving subassemblies
from other sources to assemble the radars. Hence for a long time, building surface radars in low
volume had been the norm. However, since the last few years the plant also has been producing
some of these subassemblies in high volume. Due to this, the facility had to transition from a
predominantly low volume manufacturing environment to one that includes high volume
assembly lines.
This thesis examines the challenges that arose due to the transition from a low volume to a high
volume manufacturing environment. One of the major problems examined was throughput
variability on a high volume assembly line. It has been determined that throughput variability
can be reduced by achieving line coordination; i.e. "balance in the flow across the assembly
line".
This thesis emphasizes the importance of effective execution of the production plan to reduce
throughput variability. It focuses on three key areas that needed improvement - Culture,
Manufacturing Practices and Business Systems. The thesis includes improvements implemented
to achieve line coordination.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen C. Graves
Title: Abraham J. Siegel Professor of Management
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel E. Whitney, Thesis Supervisor
Title: Senior Lecturer, MIT Engineering Systems Division
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Raytheon Company
Raytheon Company is an industry leader in defense and government electronics, space,
information technology, business aviation and special mission aircraft'. The company's vision is
to be the most admired defense and aerospace systems supplier through world-class people and
technology. To achieve this vision, Raytheon divided its business into four strategic business
areas: Precision Engagement weapons, Missile Defense, Homeland Security and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The company, headquartered in Waltham, MA, generated
$18.1 billion in revenues in 2003 and employs 78,000 people worldwide. The technologies
needed to achieve the Ballistic Missile Defense System mission - radars, sensors, target
discrimination systems, guidance and control systems - are among Raytheon's core strengths.
1.2 Raytheon - Integrated Defense Systems (IDS)
Raytheon-IDS (formerly Raytheon Electronic Systems), a business within Raytheon Company, is
a world leader in Missile defense. The company's "One Company" focus and commitment to its
customers makes it one of the defense industry's leading missile systems integration businesses.
Some of IDS's well known products are Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
Radars, the HAWK/AMRAAM Air Defense System and the Patriot Missile System.
Headquartered in Tewksbury, MA, IDS generates approximately $3.1 billion in revenues and
employs more than 11,000 people.
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IDS's main manufacturing facility in Andover, MA, is a major surface radar and world class
commodity manufacturing center. This manufacturing facility reorganized in Nov 2002, around
the customer into Value Streams. A value stream is a group of people- design engineers,
manufacturing engineers, production control staff, supply chain people - that are directly linked
to a particular customer2 . The value streams manufacture products not only for the Andover
facility but also for the entire Raytheon organization.
The work for this thesis was conducted in the Microwave Value Stream.
1.3 Microwave Value Stream
The microwave value stream produces precision high volume microwave subassemblies for the
Phased Array Radars required for THAAD, BMDS, SBX and other ballistic missile defense
programs. The radars that use these subassemblies are assembled by the Integration value stream.
Further information on these programs can be obtained at Raytheon's website3 .
The microwave value stream is organized along various product based cells and each cell is led
by a Cell Leader (Manufacturing Manager), reporting to the Value Stream Manager. The value
stream is managed by the Value Stream Manager who reports to the Director of Manufacturing
(Figure 1). The Value Stream Manager also reports to Integrated Product Team (IPT) Leaders
responsible for various programs. The organization is set up in such a way that the Integrated
Product Teams reporting to the Program Managers focus on customers whereas the Value
Stream Managers and the Director of Manufacturing focus on execution.
2 Shoot for the Moon - The Manufacturer, July 2002 Vol 2 Issue 7
3 www.raytheon.com
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Figure 1: Microwave Value Stream Organization Chart
1.4 The Product
At the time of this internship, the microwave value stream was building antenna subassemblies
for a surface radar system. This radar system is part of a strong, coordinated defense against
incoming theater ballistic missiles. The surface radar is a large phased array radar that contains
around 20,000 identical transmit/receive microwave subassemblies as part of the antenna. A few
of these microwave subassemblies are packaged into an antenna subassembly and about 3000
such antenna subassemblies are then placed in the array aperture of the surface radar structure.
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The microwave value stream assembles the precision microwave antenna subassemblies. The
parts to build the antenna subassemblies are sourced both from internal and external suppliers.
The finished subassemblies are delivered to the Systems Integration and Test group that
assembles these subassemblies into the array structure to populate the antenna aperture. This
radar is then tested and delivered to the customer.
The research for this thesis was conducted in the final assembly line of this antenna subassembly.
1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the company and the division where the research was
conducted for this thesis. The motivation for this project is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 2 is an overview of concepts and terms used in the thesis.
Chapter 3 presents the background to provide the reader with an understanding of the
environment the research was conducted in, and defines the problem statement.
Chapter 4 covers the analysis conducted to identify the factors contributing to the problem.
Chapter 5 is a detailed description of the implementation steps undertaken to resolve the
problem.
Chapter 6 covers the challenges faced during the internship.
Chapter 7 presents conclusions from the internship.
Chapter 8 highlights future projects identified for further research.
12
1.6 Project Motivation
The internship was jointly sponsored by the Strategic Operations group and the
Manufacturing/Engineering group within IDS. When Raytheon won the contract to build the
Surface Radar, the Andover plant had to compete with other Raytheon facilities and external
subcontractors to win the manufacturing contract to build the subassemblies and integrate and
test the Surface Radar. There were a lot of skeptics in the company who felt that Andover's core
competency was systems integration and not component manufacturing. They believed that
Andover did not have the expertise to manufacture the required parts, mainly because it had been
a systems integration facility in the past. They believed that the components/sub-assemblies
could be manufactured in a more cost effective manner by other Raytheon facilities. The
Strategic Operations group played an important role in highlighting Andover's manufacturing
capabilities, bringing the much needed work to this plant and orchestrating its successful
integration into what is now called Raytheon's Air Defense Center (IADC) in Andover, MA.
In addition, Raytheon has multiple other contracts to build similar radar systems with deliveries
in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Successful delivery of the product for this program helps grow
continued future business to IDS and IADC at Andover. However, in June 2003 (the time of the
internship), this antenna subassembly line was facing many challenges, some of which were
technical. The production process was not under control. The major task of the internship, as
defined by the management, was to investigate and ensure that the assembly line would be
equipped with the right processes to deliver the product on schedule when the technical problems
were fixed. Therefore, it was important to implement process improvements, to effectively
accomplish high volume component manufacturing.
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1.7 Project Approach
The internship started by taking a big picture view of the antenna subassembly's final assembly
line processes. Following this, the project plan identifying important milestones (as shown in
Figure 2), was prepared within the first two weeks of the project.
The project was split up into multiple phases. The initial phase focused on gathering data to
identify the primary problem that needed to be solved. The first few weeks were spent in
discussions with key stakeholders - Quality Assurance and Control groups, Design Engineering,
Process Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering groups - to identify and document the
issues. Most of the information was collected through one-on-one interviews and brainstorming
sessions. This helped in understanding multiple perspectives.
The next phase was the analysis phase to identify the areas that needed improvement. The
implementation phase included developing and implementing recommendations and tools based
on the analysis and literature survey.
14
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The focus of the research was to balance the production manufacturing flow, through improved
line management. This section describes some of the relevant concepts and terms adopted in the
process improvements.
2.1 Lean Manufacturing
Lean Manufacturing is a systematic approach to achieve customer satisfaction, through
continuous improvement to create value by eliminating waste. One of the reasons Lean
manufacturing has been quite popular is because it provides processes to add value by focusing
on eliminating waste and inefficiency, thereby freeing up resources needed elsewhere in the
business. However, Lean techniques typically need augmentation to optimize their effectiveness.
This thesis addresses such a situation.
The intent of this internship was not to implement Lean manufacturing, but to use some of the
Lean tools to reduce throughput variability by achieving line coordination.
In Lean Thinking4 , Womack and Jones state five principles for Lean manufacturing:
1. Value - It is defined as "Value for the customer". i.e., value is what the customer is
willing to pay for. To identify value and eliminate waste, every one in the system has to
understand who the customer is and what the customer wants.
2. Value Stream - A Value Stream is the complete set of activities required to deliver a
product or service. The concept of value stream requires visibility into other
4 Womack, James P. and Jones, Daniel T.; Lean Thinking, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996
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organizations - thus enabling the sharing of best practices, eliminating non-value added
activities.
3. Flow - Once the value stream is identified, the product has to flow through the value
stream. Flow enables the activities in the value stream to be connected and hence
communicate with each other.
4. Pull - Instead of pushing product, Pull means that a product or service is delivered only
when the customer pulls for it. In a production environment, this means that no upstream
operation produces a part until its downstream operation asks for it.
5. Perfection - This last principle highlights the importance of transformation through
continuous improvement. Once an improvement opportunity is identified, the process
should go through the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle5 to strive for perfection.
The Lean approach is to apply these principles to identify and eliminate waste. Waste is defined
as any non-value added activity (activity the customer is not paying for e.g. material handling,
inspection).
The following are some of the tools used for Lean manufacturing. Only the tools that are relevant
to or implemented in this project are discussed here. A detailed discussion of these and other
Lean tools can be found in Lean Thinking6 .
s Shiba, Shoji and Walden, David; Four Practical Revolutions in Management: Systemsfor Creating Unique
Organizational Capability, Productivity Press, Portland, Oregon, 2001
6 Womack, James P. and Jones, Daniel T.; Lean Thinking, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996
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2.1.1 Takt Time
Takt in German means a conductor's baton. In production, Takt time is used like a baton to
synchronize the production rate to the customer delivery rate. This ensures that customer demand
is met on time. Takt time is defined as:
Takt time = Available production Time/Customer delivery rate
For this project, available production time in a day was 7 /2 hours. This is equal to 450 minutes.
The delivery rate objective was 30 units per day. Therefore, Takt time = 450/30 = 15 minutes.
This implies that the line had to deliver a unit every 15 minutes.
2.1.2 Standardized Work
Workers in a Lean cell are teams that are required to perform all the operations in the cell.
Standardized work makes this possible so that the team follows the same approach every time,
while providing stability to the process. This makes it possible to accurately measure and plan
throughput and also to continuously improve the operation methodology. Standardized work also
enables the production process to deliver the product according to the Takt time.
2.1.3 5S/Workplace Organization
5S is a tool for workplace organization. The 5S are Sort, Store, Shine, Standardize and Sustain.
This tool enables better teamwork through self-discipline. Sort and Store require identifying the
equipment and tools needed and storing these in the right places. Shine forces the team to keep
the equipment, tools and hence the workplace clean to provide a better work environment.
Standardize and Sustain are for defining and standardizing procedures for various activities in
the cell. This facilitates sharing of the right information among team members.
19
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Raytheon extends the standard 5S chart to include Safety as the sixth parameter, to ensure that
the workplace is also scored in terms of safety. Refer to Exhibit A for Raytheon's 6S checklist.
2.1.4 Visual Control
In a Lean cell, the workers are a part of cross-trained teams. Workers have to feel empowered for
continuous improvement and team work. This is possible only when they are aligned with the
organization's goals and know how their efforts are contributing to these goals.
In the LFM thesis7 , Implementation of a System of Visual Indicators at Intel's D2 Fab, Smith
highlights that the traditional manufacturing systems' view suggests that manufacturing systems
require the following three inputs: capital, material and labor, to produce one output: the product.
He argues that this view is incomplete because it does not consider an equally important input -
information. Information puts the above three inputs together to provide performance indicators
to make manufacturing systems more efficient. Visual controls provide the means to share
information to produce the product.
2.1.5 Single Piece Flow
In a manufacturing line with Single Piece Flow, the parts flow through the line one at a time, as
opposed to in a batch. This is more efficient because parts don't wait in queue to be batched to
move to the next operation. Single Piece Flow enables the product to flow through the line
without interruptions, thus achieving Lean's third principle (Flow).
Single Piece Flow is especially efficient for this assembly line, because the line produced only
one type of product. Therefore, no changeovers or setups were required from one part to another.
7 Smith, Erik S.; Implementation of a System of Visual Indicators at Intel's D2 Fab, LFM Thesis, June 2003
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2.1.6 Lead Time
Lead time is the amount of time between releasing material to the floor and delivering the
finished goods to the customer. Lead time includes both the value added time (actual processing
of the part) and the non-value added time (time a part spends on the floor waiting to be
processed). Application of relevant Lean principles helps reduce non-value added time, hence
reducing lead time.
2.1.7 Dynamic Cycle Time
Dynamic cycle time is a statistically probable value for predicting the lead time assuming an
unchanged environment. Dynamic cycle time is an important aspect in production because it
helps in identifying the WIP levels for a required lead time and throughput, based on Little's law,
Dynamic Cycle Time = WIP/Throughput
2.2 Theory of Constraints
Theory of constraints is a management philosophy based on improving an organizations
performance by identifying and managing its constraints. A constraint can be either a process or
a machine or any other resource that constraints the organization from moving forward to
achieve its goal. This concept was first introduced in The Goal8 mainly to improve output in
factories with production delays. Managing constraints means that it does not matter if the
outputs from individual processes or resources are improved unless the bottleneck (slowest
resource) is improved because the output of the system is driven by the output of its bottleneck.
8 Goldratt, Eliyahu M. and Cox, Jeff ; The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement, North River Press, New York,
1986
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2.3 Six Sigma
Six Sigma is a statistical measure of processes to reduce service or product failures. Six Sigma
was first introduced to Raytheon in 1998 to establish a company-wide culture to maintain
superior quality while growing the business. The methodology was developed by benchmarking
other companies and leveraging internal best practices.
Raytheon Six SigmaTM launched in 1999 is more than quantitative statistical manufacturing
quality control. It encompasses every aspect of company's work to push the decision making to
lower levels with a fact based problem solving approach. Raytheon qualifies employees at two
levels, Specialists ("Green Belts") and Experts ("Black Belts").
Raytheon is a stakeholder and co-director of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)9 at MIT, but
does not have a company-wide Lean initiative. Raytheon Six SigmaTM processes and tools cover
most of the Lean implementation opportunities and techniques. Any process improvements
including Lean initiatives are implemented by employees as Raytheon Six SigmaTM projects.
9 http://Iean.mit.edu
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3 BACKGROUND
3.1 The Environment
This section describes the operational environment of the line at the time of the research.
3.1.1 Tight Schedules
The contracts with the customer stipulate that Raytheon deliver the radars to the customer
according to a predefined schedule. These contracts operate under heavy penalties for missing
schedules. Raytheon will also receive a certain percentage of the contract value as bonus, if all
the required cost, quality and schedule objectives are achieved. These reasons make it very
important for all the value streams and suppliers to deliver the required quality parts on time and
within budget to build, integrate and test the radar.
3.1.2 Low Volume Culture
The MRP system determined the required throughput rates for the final assembly line, based on
these promised schedules. Therefore, the demand was known and was more or less constant on a
daily basis. However, if the daily rates were not met for a certain period, the production
requirement increased to make up for the backlog. The large phased array radars that the
Andover plant typically manufactures are built in low volume, a few per year. In contrast, this
particular antenna subassembly target production rate was 150 to 300 per week. This was a
relatively high volume for this plant. Because the plant was used to making parts in low volume,
the culture and hence the processes and tools are not geared for high volume manufacturing.
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3.1.3 Large WIP
The production for this subassembly began in November 2002. By the start of the internship in
June 2003, no parts were delivered to the customer due to various technical problems in
production. In July 2003, there were about 2000 parts in WIP, while the contract was to deliver a
little more than 3000 parts. The material was released to the floor according to the production
plan and the assembly line continued to process parts through the initial assembly steps. Most of
the parts in the WIP were in the input buffers of the operations facing technical problems. The
first batch of parts (about 50 parts) was delivered to the customer in late July 2003.
3.1.4 Lean Manufacturing Initiative
The Andover plant had adopted a Raytheon Six SigmaTM project to implement Lean
manufacturing. The plant was organized into Value Streams. The manufacturing areas in the
Microwave Value Stream were laid out as product based cells. The cell layout is an efficient
layout for high volume manufacturing, as can be seen by its application in high volume assembly
lines like in the automobile industry. The line operated as a Single Piece Flow line. This allowed
for the parts to be worked on as soon as they were processed by the previous operation, instead
of waiting to be batched.
The Lean principles were however not implemented across the entire value stream. The
microwave value stream did not operate as a true "Value Stream" in terms of sharing information
with suppliers and customers. The assembly line was indeed designed based on Lean principles,
for the initial process when the production for this product started. However, due to the technical
issues with the product, the process changed significantly after the layout was designed and
many operations were either added or moved in the process. This resulted in a layout that did not
flow efficiently from the first operation to the last operation. Though the layout of the assembly
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line was designed based on Lean principles, the floor layout had become sub optimized and less
efficient than originally envisioned.
3.1.5 The Assembly Line
The assembly line was designed to make 30 parts per day, in two shifts. The process was mostly
manual, consisting of about 20 operations including thermal and environmental testing. Some of
these operations required highly skilled labor including the use of highly specialized tools and
equipment.
The operators working on the line were unionized. The line was supervised by two foremen who
reported to the Cell Leader. Two manufacturing engineers were available on the floor to resolve
engineering issues. The operators followed work instructions available online via a monitor at
every station. The manufacturing engineers were responsible for keeping the work instructions
up- to-date, incorporating the new process and change improvements.
3.1.6 Technical Issues
At the start of the internship, the manufacturing line had been missing schedules and facing
many technical challenges. The main challenge was the Ribbon Bonding operation. Ribbon
bonding is high yield interconnect process that uses heat and ultrasonic energy to form a
metallurgical bond. This operation was unreliable and produced poor first pass and test yields,
resulting in 100% rework. A team of expert engineers was already in place to address the
problems with this operation. This team also included another LFM intern whose internship was
to bring this operation under control10 . A snapshot analysis of the 700 parts in the WIP made it
obvious that this was the primary bottleneck.
10 Balazs, Brett; Visual Tools: Controlling and Improving the Ribbon Bond Process, LFM Thesis, June 2004
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The other challenge was the misalignment of the components after Environmental Test. This was
mainly due to the design being not robust enough for high volume manufacturing. Another team
of engineers addressed this problem.
The third problem was an important quality problem due to RF leakage (ripple problem). This
was noticed after processing hundreds of units. This problem reduced the yield considerably. The
reason for this was inadequate testing during proof of manufacturing. In addition, the design
modeling and simulation tools were inadequate to predict and detect this phenomenon. This
problem was addressed by introducing highly manual-intensive rework.
The situation was further made difficult due to a culture clash' 1 between design and
manufacturing groups. The design group always wanted more data to find the root cause for the
problems during manufacturing. However, because of the technical problems during production,
Manufacturing did not have enough resources to take the extra measurements necessary to
provide the ever increasing volumes of data. Moreover, some of the design decisions resulted in
complicated manufacturing processes making it more difficult to gather the required data.
For the purpose of this internship, it was assumed that the technical problems would be solved in
the near future. As of three months into the internship, most of the product/process technical
issues had been solved.
3.1.7 Shop Floor Data Management
The assembly line used a software system called Shop Floor Data Manager (SFDM). SFDM is a
floor control and non-conformance tracking software tool. Operators logged their work into this
system. This system provided all the operational and financial metrics. Analysis of data from this
" Engineering review meetings at Raytheon
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system was laborious and often error prone. Extensive investigation showed that the process
engineering group that set up the system did not completely understand the high volume
manufacturing requirements. A combination of incorrect implementation of SFDM and
insufficient user training resulted in people entering a lot of data into the system that could not be
used for any decision making. In addition, the management and the operators spent a significant
amount of time manually reconciling the SFDM data with the status on the floor.
In summary, the following issues directly impacted the throughput rates:
* The operators were unaware of the daily goals and other metrics.
" The management did not have a catch-up plan to compensate for the backlog.
* The foremen were often caught by surprise with frequent product/process design changes.
* There was a large amount of WIP on the floor because there was no consensus on the
daily work plan.
* The testing during proof of manufacturing was insufficient - a view shared by both the
design and manufacturing engineering groups
* A significant amount of time was spent on manual collection of data on the floor in spite
of having the SFDM system.
* There was a lot of variability in the daily throughput.
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3.2 Problem Statement
The radar subassembly line was missing customer delivery schedules due to variable daily
production rates. The objective of this internship was to achieve line coordination to deliver the
planned throughput.
In a well coordinated line, each operation consistently produces only the units required to meet
the day's throughput goals. That is, the flow through the line is balanced. This improves planning
and reduces variability, thus reducing inventory buffers. Reduction in variability also reduces the
WIP. Flow balancing also improves worker efficiency because the operation standard time is
12matched to the Takt time
2 Czarnecki, Hank; and Loyd, Nicholas; Simulation of Lean Assembly Linefor High Volume Manujacturing
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4 ANALYSIS
This phase of the internship focused on the analysis of the data and processes to identify the
sources of throughput variability and to determine the root cause for the problems.
4.1 Sources of Variability
4.1.1 Cause and Effect Analysis
The numerous interviews with shop floor managers, design and manufacturing engineers, quality
personnel and operators helped in gaining multiple opinions and perspectives for the sources of
throughput variability. The following fishbone diagram (Figure 3) categorizes these sources. The
highlighted boxes represent those attributes targeted during the course of this internship.
Some of the key sources for throughput variability are:
Culture: Both the manufacturing and design groups were accustomed to making parts in low
volumes. Therefore, the procedures and long term plans did not support high volume
manufacturing. The employees did not understand the goals and the plans to achieve these goals.
"Problem of the Day" was given far more importance than long term plans, fostering a fire-
fighting environment.
Manufacturing: The line was facing technical problems. There was no framework to manage
bottlenecks once the technical problems were solved. The standard work instructions changed
frequently due to design and process improvements. The supervisors were often unaware of these
upcoming changes.
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Business systems: There was no data integrity between SFDM data and the hardware on the
floor. People spent a significant amount of non-value added time accessing and correcting SFDM
data.
Machines: The ribbon bond machine was not producing at expected yields. This was the
bottleneck in the line. There was only one test machine for two different test operations. This
machine was shared with other product lines. There was no predetermined schedule on the
availability of this test machine.
Design: The design of the part was not robust enough for high volume manufacturing. It was too
late to change the design for this program because some of the key components were already
sourced from the suppliers.
Material: The line was often starved due to lack of quality material from the suppliers, both
internal and external.
Training: Training was inadequate to accommodate the continual introduction of new processes
as part of rework.
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Figure 3: Sources of Throughput Variability
Based on these key findings, the internship narrowed down the focus to the three areas
highlighted in figure 3, for further analysis and subsequent improvements. This was done to
effectively address the issues and make a difference with sustainable improvements in the short
duration of six months of the internship.
4.1.2 Root Cause Analysis
The sources of throughput variability (identified in Figure 3) were modeled as causal loops
(Figure 4) to identify the root cause for the problem.
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Figure 4: Systems Dynamics Model Highlighting the Root Cause and the Variables Affected by the Root Cause
The above systems dynamics model has three types of variables: stocks, flows and auxiliaries.
Stocks are variables that accumulate over time and are shown as rectangles. "Production thruput"
is the stock variable in the above diagram. Clouds in the diagram represent stocks that are out of
scope (boundaries) for the system. Flows are rates at which material enters or leaves a stock.
These are represented by pipes (double arrows) with valves. The arrow shows the direction of the
flow. In this diagram, "Material from upstream" is the inflow and "Material delivered to
downstream" is the outflow. Auxiliaries are variables that are used to calculate the values of
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inflows and outflows. These do not have a graphical representation and are shown by the
variable name. The single arrows represent the causality between a pair of auxiliaries in the
system. A "+" sign at the arrow head implies that the variables connected by the arrow move in
the same direction. For e.g., the arrow connecting "Schedule pressure" and "Need for
design/process improvement" indicates that as "Schedule pressure" increases, "Need for
design/process improvement" also increases. Similarly, A "-" sign at the arrow head implies that
the variables connected by the arrow move in opposite directions. For instance, the arrow
connecting "Number of changes" and "Production plan execution" indicates that as "Number of
changes" increases, "Production plan execution" decreases. For more information on the use of
causal loops for systems dynamics modeling, please refer to Business Dynamics1.
The model has two types of loops: Reinforcing loops (R) and Balancing loops (B). Following is
an explanation for two of these loops to illustrate reading the above diagram.
Balancing loop: In the "Better Process" loop, as the "Production thruput" decreases, the
"Schedule pressure" increases, thus increasing the "Need for a design/process improvement".
This in turn increases the number of "Process improvements" which will increase the
"Production thruput". Therefore this balancing loop balances the throughput via process
improvements.
Reinforcing loop: The "Morale" loop shows that, as the "Production thruput" decreases, the
"Schedule pressure" increases, thus increasing the "Need for a design/process improvement".
This in turn increases the "Number of changes". As the "Number of changes" increase, the
ability for "Production plan execution" decreases. Because of this, "Adhoc work assignments"
13 Sterman, John D.; Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, Irwin/McGraw-
Hill,
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increase which results in reducing the "Employee morale". Lower "Employee morale" results in
lower "Productivity", thus decreasing the "Production thruput". Therefore, this reinforcing loop
reinforces or further decreases the production throughput.
The model highlights that there are a lot of these reinforcing loops that have a high impact on
"Production thruput". It is important to make sure that these act in a positive way, to improve the
throughput. As can be seen in the model, all these loops originate from "Production plan
execution", i.e., the ability to execute the production plan well would drive these loops to further
increase the throughput. Due to this, it is important to analyze and control the parameters that
effect the execution of production plan.
The above analysis concluded that the root cause for throughput variability was that the assembly
line was unable to effectively execute the production plan.
The following situation analysis explains in detail, the factors leading to these sources of
throughput variability.
4.2 Situation Analysis
The situation analysis was conducted along the following parameters:
4.2.1 Integrated Product Team (JPT)
The program this radar subassembly belonged to, was the first where Raytheon-IDS was
attempting a product centric program management using IPTs. Each IPT was led by the IPT lead.
The IPT members included representatives from various groups like design engineering,
manufacturing, materials and quality. The IPT organization facilitated cross-functional
communication, while taking advantage of functional expertise of the representatives, thus
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enabling improved quality and reduced cycle time. On the whole, using this program
14
management approach proved useful and was being carried over to other programs
While the IPT helped with providing cross-functional input for designing the parts, the
manufacturing process development did not follow a similar peer review process. The tool
15
design and other manufacturing aspects were not fully validated by a cross-functional team
This resulted in fixturing errors and several other inefficient manufacturing processes, as
identified in the fishbone diagram (Figure 3).
4.2.2 Design Engineering
There was an intense cost and schedule pressure right from the inception of the program. The
First Article Verification for manufacturing was done in September 2002, (though a later one
done in April 2003 proved to be more useful). This resulted in a design that was still not robust
enough for high volume manufacturing.
Design engineering also operates in a low volume culture. They often revisited decisions made in
the past and introduced manual intensive rework to fix the design. Fixes introduced as temporary
ones became permanent solutions. At the start of the internship the design problems produced
unplanned rework and frequent change notices. This put the line in a constant fire-fighting mode,
leaving almost no time for long term planning or process improvements. Even after the bulk of
the design problems had been addressed, the line seemed to be operating in the same fire-fighting
mode.
This can be made clear with the following examples:
35
" Conversations with the IPT Lead
' Conversations with Design Engineer
To fix the RF leakage problem mentioned in Section 3.1, Design Engineering introduced a
rework process. This added three new operations that required highly skilled labor. The operators
were not well trained, so the operations took longer than expected. Moreover, the inspectors
either passed defective parts or failed good parts, because of a lack of training. Therefore, this
process caused a lot of delays. It was not uncommon to starve the assembly line because there
was not enough manpower for this rework process. Eventually, the operators did get better at this
process and the line was no longer starved, but the extra resources still needed to be maintained.
In another instance, the design engineer assigned to fix the mechanical alignment problem
recommended that the best solution was to perform the alignment multiple times, instead of the
planned one time alignment. The design engineer's study proved that presenting the part multiple
times to the fixture provided good yields because each presentation improved the alignment.
However, the design engineer did not seem to consider the 30 minutes it took for each iteration.
This would be an effective solution if the parts were manufactured in low volume. But
performing these extra iterations on thousands of parts proved to be quite time consuming and
expensive. After following this recommended procedure for a few weeks, both the design and
manufacturing groups agreed to revise the specifications to avoid these multiple iterations.
The concept of Key Characteristics (KC) introduced by the previous LFM intern1 6 was believed
to be widely in use. However, the design engineering group used these key characteristics to
measure the parts during manufacturing, but not during the design process as intended. The
above mechanical alignment problem is an example of not applying the KC concept during
design, because there was no data or knowledge if the KCs for the subassembly are delivered
16 Lund, Mack R.; Predicling Manufacturing Performance ofNew Radar Subassembly Designs, LFM Thesis, June
2003
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from the component KCs. Proper application of KCs during design would have identified these
problems much earlier, even before having to manufacture and test them 7 .
The research conducted by the LFM intern in 200218, discusses the importance of concurrent
engineering and the impact of design problems on the "leanability" of the manufacturing system.
The Lean techniques are proven to be more effective when the design is mature 9 . These factors
make the impact of design engineering an important factor for any process improvement.
4.2.3 Process Flow
In June 2003, the assembly process consisted of 18 operations. However, the work content of the
operations and the number of operations often changed, resulting in a process sheet
(Standardized Work instructions) that was updated almost every month. This made it very
difficult to calculate Standardized Work and plan the production requirements based on Takt
time.
Figure 5 shows the process flow diagram for the radar subassembly. This process flow diagram
captures the sequence of operations in the general assembly process and may not depict exactly
the flow at a given point of time due to the frequent changes in the process.
The raw material was staged in the crib and materials were released to the floor based on the
MRP schedule. The parts then went through a few initial assembly operations before the first
inspection step. Parts that passed the inspection proceeded to the next assembly steps. Parts that
failed inspection were either placed on the Redrack or assigned to a rework operation.
" Conversations with LFM Thesis Advisor Daniel Whitney
18 Sweitzer, Timothy J.; A Simulation-Based Concurrent Engineering Approach For Assembly System Design, LFM
Thesis, June 2002
'9 Discussions with Lean experts at Raytheon Advance Product Center, Dallas
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After passing the second inspection step, the parts went through cleaning operations before
proceeding to the ribbon bond operation. After the ribbon bond operation was successfully
completed, the parts went through a few test operations including thermal and environmental
tests. Parts that passed these tests proceeded to the final operations in the assembly process. The
parts were then delivered to the customer after passing the final inspection.
Input buffers (WIP) were maintained for each of the operations. There were no limits on the
sizes of these buffers. WIP for rework was maintained after each of the inspection steps.
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Figure 5: Process Flow for the Antenna Subassembly
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The parts were tagged with an SFC number (Shop Floor Control number) that was unique to
each part. The operators took parts from the assigned operation's input buffer (WIP), performed
the operation and placed them in the input buffer for the next operation.
4.2.4 Process Layout
All the assembly operations were in one area and were visible to each other. The ribbon bonding
and related rework operations were in a separate room with glass walls in the same area, making
these operations visible to the main assembly area. The test operations including the input
buffers for these operations were in a separate room away from the main assembly area. Figure 6
shows the process layout.
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Figure 6: Process Layout of the Antenna Subassembly line
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The assembly and inspection operations were all manual. The workstations were designed to
perform any of the operations. Though the operations required specific tools, the tools were
portable and could be carried to any workstation. This allowed the operations to be performed at
different workstations depending on where the operators liked to work and the number of
operators working on an operation at a time. The number of workstations for each of the
operations was based on the required throughput and the time required for performing the
operation.
Example: ASYI takes 45 minutes and ASY3 takes 80 minutes. To produce 30 parts per day,
with a takt time of 15 minutes:
Number of operators required for ASY I = 45/15 = 3. That is, ASY 1 requires 3 workstations.
Number of operators required for ASY3 = 80/15 = 5.3. That is, ASYI requires 5 to 6
workstations.
In practice, the number of workstations used for a particular operation also changed based on the
availability of operators on first and second shifts.
4.2.5 Production Planning
The production rates were planned by the MRP system. MRP systems are good for planning and
hence push the product through the systemn to control the throughput. The material was released
to the floor according to the production plan. There was no control over the WIP because the
MRP system did not take into account the current WIP on the floor to release the material. The
priority of the work to be performed was solely based on the foremen's judgment. Though the
20 Hopp, Wallace J. and Spearman, Mark L.; Factory Physics, Foundations ofManufacturing Management,
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA, 1996
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Cell Leader had a manufacturing scorecard, neither the foremen nor the operators were aware of
its existence or usage. There was no consensus between the first and second shift foremen on the
daily production goals. The following example illustrates this problem:
The following table shows the production throughput on July 24, 2003.
Date Operation Throughput
7/24/2003 ASYI 55
7/24/2003 ASY2 166
7/24/2003 ASY3 65
7/24/2003 ASY4 18
7/24/2003 ASY5 11
At one point during the day, six operators worked on ASY3. The next day 72 parts were in the
input buffer for ASY4 (output from ASY3). But, no trained operator was available to work on
ASY4 due to planned and unplanned outages. One took the whole week off, one took the day off,
one is on a week's leave for surgery etc. This shows that if planned well, some of the six
operators working on ASY3 should have been assigned to ASY4 to ensure throughput from
ASY4. But, the supervisor focused on output for just the 2 4 th and not over a longer term. On
25 th, operators were still processing ASY3, in spite of high WIP in ASY4.
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Figure 7 highlights the variability in the operation throughput rates.
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Figure 7: Daily throughput in June and July 2003 from the first five operations
4.2.6 Work Assignments
Most of the operators were assigned to specific operations and worked only on those operations.
There were a few operators that were cross trained to work on multiple operations. There was a
plan in place to cross train all the operators, but no specific deadline was assigned. The foremen
believed that operators in general liked to work only on their assigned operations and did not like
to get cross-trained.
4.2.7 Handling of Defective Parts
Parts that failed inspection were placed on the "Redrack" (Figure 6) that was used by all
operations. A part could be placed on the Redrack by anyone at any operation. The
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manufacturing engineers were responsible for resolving problems and sending these parts back
into assembly. The manufacturing engineer could access the part's status by entering the SFC
number in SFDM. There were no limits on the number of parts on the Redrack. However, there
was a general agreement with the customer that the parts on Redrack would be resolved by the
manufacturing engineer and sent back to rework within two days.
4.2.8 Process Control
The Process Control group, different from Design and Manufacturing groups, proposed many
initiatives for ensuring process control. Some of the initiatives included Statistical Process
Control (SPC) of the Key Characteristics as identified by the Design Engineering group. At the
start of the internship, the manufacturing group did not support these initiatives. The group was
unwilling to collect the data required for ensuring process control and for data analysis by
engineering. This was because the manufacturing group was busy dealing with production
problems. Because the process was not streamlined (not under control), collecting data for this
purpose represented additional non-value added effort and was not a priority at this stage.
However, they were very supportive a few months later when the process was better streamlined,
largely through demonstration that the information gleaned from this data was indeed value-
added.
The ribbon bond process is a good example of Manufacturing's initiatives for process control.
Manufacturing was very supportive of the new initiative (heated fixture) to improve the process.
Their cooperation with the DOE2 ' (Design of Experiments) helped the team identify ideal
parameters to run the machine. The ribbon bond operation has since been using the SPC charts
2' Balazs, Brett; Visual Tools: Controlling and Improving the Ribbon Bond Process, LFM Thesis, June 2004
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and other process indicators, recommended by the other LFM intern , successfully to keep this
process under control.
22 Balazs, Brett; Visual Tools: Controlling and Improving the Ribbon Bond Process, LFM Thesis, June 2004
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5 IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
The internship implemented process improvements and provided tools (addressing the three
areas identified in the fishbone diagram, Figure 3) to resolve some of the problems that
prevented effective execution of the production plan.
5.1 Culture
"Employees are intelligent individuals who are motivated by work that keeps them informed
about how their efforts affect the outcome and gives them power and responsibility to reach their
goals." - The Visual Factory23
5.1.1 Key Performance Metrics
As mentioned in the earlier sections, this plant operated in a low volume culture. The assembly
line was not equipped to measure and track the metrics in an effective manner. In addition, the
metrics and frequency of measurement as identified by management were not in alignment with
the performance goals. Consequently, the metrics and goals were not properly communicated to
the people on the line.
The Cell Leader reported the progress twice a week to the plant manager. An example of this
report is shown in Exhibit B. This report tracked the throughput of every operation, which meant
that every operation was monitored. A production control support person spent four hours every
day to gather all the data required to generate this report. While most of the data was available in
SFDM, this data did not accurately represent the status on the floor (Section 5.3 explains
23 Greif, Michael; The Visual Factory: Building Participation Through Shared Information, Productivity Press,
Portland, Oregon, 1991
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problems with SFDM). This necessitated frequent manual verifications to ensure the accuracy of
the information reported to senior management. This was a much less efficient system than
capturing the data accurately in the SFDM system once, and then using that information for
analysis and reporting. This highlights a particular aspect of the prevailing culture - working
around the problem rather than fixing the root cause of the problem.
The above report (Exhibit B) not only took a lot of time to generate but also failed to identify
future actions. Therefore, the first step was to identify a set of Key Performance Metrics and
provide tools to access the data for these metrics.
Implementation of Key Performance Metrics
To better measure the metrics, the internship established "Gates'" at logical points at the end of
certain operations. A "Gate" is a logical endpoint of a sequence of operations. The "Gates" were
established based on the similarity and criticality of the operations. With the introduction of the
"Gates", throughput was monitored at each individual "Gate", rather than at each individual
operation. This simplified the line management because the throughput was monitored at fewer
points (Gates). The Gate-based management also resulted in strengthening the team environment
among the operators because they worked together to meet the throughput goals for their "Gate".
An example of the report using "Gates" is presented in Exhibit C.
Apart from the daily throughput, the internship also identified a number of other key
performance metrics (Exhibit D) based on benchmarking with other external and internal high
volume manufacturing plants. The Raytheon Advance Product Center (APC) in Dallas
especially provided useful information in this regard as they were also implementing Lean
manufacturing in their facility.
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The internship recommended that resources be allocated to ensure SFDM data integrity. This not
only saved time but also ensured data integrity - expected and necessary for any data analysis.
The tools provided by the internship made it possible to use SFDM data to generate the key
performance metrics more efficiently.
5.1.2 Visual Control
The assembly area did not have any visual controls. The displayed range charts were not updated
on a regular basis. The operators were unaware of how their contributions were affecting the
overall objectives of the assembly line.
Importance of Visual Controls
Greif24 compares the lack of visual controls in a factory floor with playing baseball where no one
knows the score. A score makes it interesting by defining what it means to win and whether you
have a chance of winning. It tells players how their individual efforts contribute to success.
In a single glance, visual controls make the information available and understandable for
everyone in the factory, changing the culture of the workplace with "sharing" as the key
principle. This also signals that the culture of sharing information, promotes the sharing of
responsibilities and success.
Implementation of Visual Controls
The internship recommended displaying those parameters that convey a message both for
internal and external groups. If a message is overly internal the group may not perceive a need
for this kind of communication. On the other hand, if the message is geared for outsiders, the
group will lose interest.
24 Greif, Michael; The Visual Factory: Building Participation Through Shared Information, Productivity Press,
Portland, Oregon, 1991
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Success of visual communication depends not only on the message but also on the location. The
internship established the location for placing the visual controls - this was the same location
from where the Cell Leader often addressed senior management and external plant tour guests.
The choice of the location was based on the concept of "Visual Territory". The visual territory is
a place that promotes the group's cohesion and also is visible to the outsiders.
The visual controls identified above (Exhibit E) to improve communication proved to be so
useful that Raytheon initiated efforts to display these on TV monitors directly from the shop
floor control system.
5.1.3 Communication
The interviews with the operators identified that there was inadequate communication between
the operators and management. The line did not hold daily production meetings. An example of
lack of communication: when asked who updated the charts on the walls and what they implied,
no one on the manufacturing floor except the Cell Leader knew the answer. Though there were
charts on the walls showing throughput rates and goals, people on the floor were unaware of this.
Previous efforts by the supervisors to conduct daily meetings to communicate the status failed
due to the fire-fighting nature of managing the line. The management also felt that the operators
were not really interested in the status. However, informal conversations with the operators
revealed that they did want to know how they were going to meet the required daily production
rate, while catching up with the increasing backlog.
The Andover plant, as part of the initiative to improve employee involvement introduced the
concept of "Raise Your Hand" (RYH) contact in each of the cells in the plant. Most of the
employees in this cell were not aware of who their RYH contact was. When operators had issues,
48
they directly communicated with their supervisors. The management was effectively resolving
these issues, but the process or the progress was unclear. There was a general belief that
management did not listen to the operators. So the operators did not take part in process
improvements or provide any feedback. This was clearly a major shortcoming, since being the
people actually touching and building parts, operators are the best people to get ideas from to
improve the process.
Importance of Communication
In a low volume line, operators are like craftsmen who take ownership of their work. If there are
process improvements to be made, they either implement these themselves or make sure they are
taken care of. Therefore, the management may not have to explicitly solicit their feedback.
However, in a high volume line this communication becomes critical not only to get ideas but
also to get the operators' buy-in for any process improvements. Effective two-way
communication is necessary for the successful implementation of processes that lead to line
coordination. Improved communication would help in building employee morale and hence the
productivity.
According to Job Characteristics Theory (JCT)2 5 , five job dimensions are critical to human
performance. These are (1) skill variety, (2) task identity, (3) task significance, (4) autonomy,
and (5) task feedback. This indicates that operators get motivated if they feel that they are
working on important tasks (task significance), and they would like feedback on how they are
doing (task feedback).
25 Genaidy Ash M. and Kawowski, Waldemar; Human Performance in Lean Production Environment: Critical
Assessment and Research Framework
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Improving the Communication
The internship introduced a dailylO-minute meeting with a set agenda, to foster the
communication between management and operators in the cell. The meeting was facilitated by
the Cell Leader who addressed all the cell members, including the manufacturing engineers and
the supervisors. This enabled the dissemination of the same information (goals, catch-up plans,
issues etc.) to everyone at the same time. In addition, limiting this kind of communication to
once a day at a scheduled time avoided the earlier problem of interrupting work for ad-hoc
communications.
The internship also recommended that the meeting be held in a special area so the operators
would get away from their workstations to attend the meeting. The location for the daily meeting
was the visual territory identified to place the visual controls. This place in the cell is open and
large enough to accommodate the whole group. Also this is the place the Cell Leader normally
uses to address senior management and external plant tour guests.
As expected, there was a lot of opposition mainly because people perceived that operators were
being taken away from their "work" for almost an hour every week. This kind of thinking
reinforces the "Work harder" culture where working longer is more important than achieving the
objective. It took considerable effort to make people understand that participating in these
meetings is part of the "work" for the operators because they need to know the status and the
catch up plan.
The internship also introduced an issues log, to log and track issues to make them visible to
everyone. These meetings were also a vehicle to share these issues and their status. The issue log
would be maintained by the "Raise Your Hand" contact in the cell.
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After holding these meetings for about two months, the Cell Leader decided to hold them once a
week instead of daily, with a group of four to five operators at a time. This was because the
supervisors believed that the operators did not see any benefit in these meetings since the daily
cell meetings did not address the operators on an individual basis.
These daily cell meetings did not provide the expected benefits for the following reasons (some
of these are recommended for further analysis by subsequent internships and are not considered
as part of this thesis):
* The line starved quite often due to a lack of material. The charts (visual controls) showed that
the throughput was constantly lagging behind the goal. This resulted in people losing interest
in the charts. This violates the first rule of the three golden rules of displayed objectives2 6
that states "The objective must be realistic. It must be attainable in terms of the available
resources and organization's rules. " As material has been an ongoing problem and the
management did not share how they were going to solve this problem, the workers did not
perceive the goal as attainable.
* The agreed upon agenda included discussing the catch-up plan, if the previous day's
throughput rates were lower than the required rate. This was never addressed in these
meetings. This violates the second rule "The objective must be precisely defined, with a
predetermined level of accuracy."
* The supervisors were expected to go over the daily work plan (Exhibit F) with each of the
operators at the start of a shift and later in the day as needed. The intent of the daily meetings
was to bring the whole group together to discuss the status at a high level to provide the same
26 Greif, Michael; The Visual Factory: Building Participation Through Shared Information, Productivity Press,
Portland, Oregon, 1991
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information at the same time to everyone. The daily cell meetings were not intended for
discussing the daily work plan because this could change during the day.
However, the supervisors never discussed the proposed daily work plan with the operators as
proposed. Instead, the Cell Leader covered this in the daily meeting highlighting the
operations that needed to be worked and those that didn't need to be worked on. Some of the
operators might have been working on the operations that didn't have to be worked, making
the operators feel like they had wasted their morning.
* The person responsible for updating the issue log did not update it often enough. This sent
the message that this chart, that highlighted the workers' issues, was not important enough
for management.
5.2 Manufacturing
"Every product or service is the outcome of a process. Therefore, the effective way to improve
quality is to improve the process used to build the product. The corollary offocusing on process
is that the focus is not results - results are dependent variable. The results come from whatever
process isfollowed, i.e. process drives results." - Four Practical Revolutions in Management27
27 Shiba, Shoji and Walden, David; Four Practical Revolutions in Management: Systems for Creating Unique
Organizational Capability, Productivity Press, Portland, Oregon, 2001
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5.2.1 Production Plan Execution
The contract for the ongoing program was to make close to 3000 parts. However, the assembly
line had a large amount of WIP, more than 2000 parts in July as shown in figure 8.
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Figure 8: Total WIP Levels in July and August 2003
Having a large amount of WIP has the following effects:
* Adds confusion due to the clutter
* Requires additional resources to keep track of and to handle material on the floor
* Hides problems - Takes longer to resolve the problems because the identified problem may
be due to the work done much earlier (a few days/week back) instead of work done recently
(a few hours back)
* Takes up valuable floor space
* Increases variability
* Increases cycle time
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Improving Production Plan Execution
The push system dictated by MRP and the lack of production run rules made it difficult to
prioritize the work. The supervisors had no tools to dynamically execute the evolving production
plan. Therefore, there was no consensus on executing the production plan. Balancing the flow is
not possible in the absence of a common understanding of goals and priorities. The high amount
of WIP and the lack of long term planning led to decisions that increased variability in the line.
Apart from providing run rules to prioritize the work, the internship recommended maintaining
finite sizes for each of the input buffers to ensure line coordination. We determined the buffer
sizes based on the following:
" throughput requirements of the line,
" complexity of each operation,
" bottleneck operations in the line, and
" the importance of an operation in providing feedback to its upstream operation
The assembly line required buffers between the operations mainly because of the various design,
material and process problems. These buffers helped in decoupling downstream operations from
upstream operations so that any interruption in the upstream operation had minimal or no impact
on the downstream operations. This was one way to insure robust manufacturing, especially in a
high volume manufacturing environment with rapid design and process improvements where
interruptions are likely to occur often.
We developed a new tool called the "Daily Work Plan" (Exhibit F), to better execute the
production plan. This tool visibly identifies the operations that needed to be worked, and the
operations that did not need to be worked, based on the buffer sizes and the required daily
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throughput rate. Effective use of this tool would not only result in sustained line coordination
but also lead to a self-directed workforce where the operators in a cell do not have to wait for the
supervisors' direction for work assignments.
The line was also behind schedule due to the technical problems faced in the early months. This
increased the daily required throughput rate to 75 per day from the initial 30 to 45 per day. The
management brought in an expeditor to help pull material through the line. Expediting helped in
pulling an extremely large amount of WIP through the line, but all the attention was focused
primarily on the bottleneck known at that time (ribbon bond operation). Moreover, expediting
increases variability, though it works as a short term solution.
We implemented a framework to determine the bottleneck in the line based on capacity and Takt
time. This helped in determining that once the ribbon bond process was fixed, the test machine
would be the bottleneck. It is important to identify and manage bottlenecks in the system because
the throughput of the system is dictated by the bottleneck throughput.
Research conducted on the production plan execution of other high volume factories within
Raytheon showed that using a pull system as advocated by Lean manufacturing would be the
best solution to reduce the WIP and variability in throughput rates. In contrast to the push
system, the pull system controls the WIP based on the actual throughput from the system, instead
of the planned throughput. In other words, a pull system makes it possible to adjust the WIP
based on actual capacity and other constraints on the resources without overproducing. The
"Daily Work Plan" was developed to support the implementation of a pull system.
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28.In addition, a pull system has the following advantages over a push system
* In a given system, it is easier to observe and control the input parameters than the output
parameters. Hence, WIP (input to the assembly line) is easier to observe and control because
the output depends on various factors like capacity, yield from each of the operations.
* The average WIP level required in a pull system is in general less than that required in the
push system for the same throughput. According to Little's law, lead time is proportional to
the WIP, making the pull system more efficient than the push system.
* Another important advantage of the pull system is less variability in throughput rates and
cycle times. In a push system, the WIP levels at each of the operations are independent of
each other, resulting in variable cycle times and hence variable lead times.
* Because the WIP levels are controlled in the pull system, the WIP levels at each of the
operations can be tuned based on the importance and complexity of the operation (bottleneck
vs. non-bottleneck). This makes the pull system more robust than the push system.
Instead of using Kanban cards, we recommended using the shelves in the racks for controlling
the WIP for each operation. See Exhibit G for an example. This implementation satisfies the
three basic requirements for visual production control29:
1. "The rule for initiating an order is visible" - We allowed the operators to work on an
operation only when there was space in the output rack. The shelves in the rack were
divided and clearly marked to accommodate the number of parts allowed to be placed in
the output rack.
28 Hopp, Wallace J. and Spearman, Mark L.; Factory Physics, Foundations of Manufacturing Management,
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA, 1996
29 Greif, Michael; The Visual Factory: Building Participation Through Shared Information, Productivity Press,
Portland, Oregon, 1991
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2. "A high level of employee involvement exists" - The "Daily work plan" tool (Exhibit F)
along with the empty spaces in the racks helped the operators decide which operation(s)
needed to be worked on, instead of waiting for direction from their supervisor.
3. "A more visual system is difficult to imagine" - This rule suggests that the chosen system
meets all the required objectives. Though using Kanbans for pull systems is industry
practice, using the shelve space is better suited for this environment as it does not create
extra work to manage Kanbans.
Effective implementation of the pull system provides a good example for the importance of
changing the culture to Lean versus using Lean principles. A pull system does not allow for an
operation to be worked on unless a downstream operation pulls material from this operation. The
supervisors understood the value of the pull system, but did not want to stop production even if
the buffer levels were at their maximum. They were concerned that if an operation was stopped
to avoid overproduction, operators might be idle at that time. For a manager walking by, this
might seem like excess capacity and provide motivation to reduce manpower. This concern
highlights the fact that changing the culture is essential to reap the benefits from the application
of Lean principles.
A pull system's success also requires availability of resources 100% of the time. This implies not
only machine reliability but also cross-trained personnel. Literature on Lean, including Lean
Thinking 0 recommend cross-training as one of the necessary steps to pull the product through a
flow line. Though this line had plans to cross-train people, practical aspects did not make it
possible to achieve 100% cross-training. This line requires highly skilled labor, but the unionized
workforce makes it difficult to choose the optimum mix of skills in a continually dynamic
30 Womack, James P. and Jones, Daniel T.; Lean Thinking, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996
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manner. Therefore, the management preferred to assign the best workers to the more
complicated operations, leaving others to work on the not so critical operations. This practice
was not aligned with the cross-training recommendation, leaving the line in jeopardy when there
was a shortage of people.
Interestingly, this project is unable to assess if the pull system helped in achieving line
coordination, mainly because the line suffered from lack of material. Two of the suppliers, both
31internal, failed in delivering the material per schedule . Without a continuous flow of input
material to the line it is not possible to pull parts through the process, to satisfy the daily
throughput requirements.
5.2.2 Floor layout
The cell scored very low in Lean Manufacturing's 5S/Workplace Organization. One of the areas
that clearly needed improvement was the "Visual Factory". The racks and shelves in the area
were not clearly labeled. There was a lot of confusion about the input/output racks for the
operations. There were no production run rules displayed in the area.
Big cabinets containing finished parts obstructed the operators from seeing other workbenches.
The layout also made it difficult for easy visual assessment of the WIP on the floor. There was a
general belief among the managers that making the operators get up from their seats is highly
unproductive not only for the wasted time spent in walking but also because of the time they
would spend socializing with others. But the layout of the floor required the operators to walk a
lot to take parts in and out of the racks.
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3' E-mail from the Cell Leader
The Raytheon Six Sigma project to improve the floor layout provided a good opportunity to
completely change the existing layout. We designed the new layout based on Lean principles.
This U-shaped layout accommodates racks next to the workstations so the operators can access
the required racks while sitting at their workstations. Because of the initiative to reduce WIP
(moving from infinite size to finite size buffers), the number of racks needed was considerably
reduced. This resulted in a compressed layout with less confusion and better visual management.
Figure 9 shows the new U-shaped layout.
We determined the number of work benches for each operation based on the Takt time and the
daily throughput requirements. The rectangles marked as "WB" in the figure below are the work
benches and the rectangles marked as "R" are the racks for input buffers for each of the
operations. In the previous layout the racks were in between the work benches. The new layout
has work stations next to each other, with the racks placed in a separate row, within easy reach of
the operators. Though there may be multiple work benches for an operation, there is only one
rack (with the input buffer) for that operation. This makes it easy for the visual control of the
WIP, so the operators can stop working when the buffer reaches its limit.
For example, the operators on work benches for ASY 1, take the parts from the rack labeled
ASYl and place the processed parts in the rack labeled ASY3 (the next operation in the
assembly process). The input racks for CLEAN operations are placed on the outer side of the
work area because the machines for these operations are in a separate location in the plant. These
racks are rollaway carts that the operators can move in and out of this work cell.
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Figure 9: U-Shaped Floor Layout
5.3 Business systems
"Information managers must begin by thinking about how people use information, not how
people use machines" - Saving IT's Soul - Thomas H. Davenport32
The Shop Floor Data Management (SFDM) system is a commercial off-the-shelf product for
shop floor control. This tool requires extensive customization to cater to the specific business
needs of the company/location of implementation.
3 Davenport, Thomas H.; "Harvard Business Review on The Business Value ofIT', A Harvard Business Review
Paperback, 1993-1999
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At Raytheon, the SFDM data was exported to a Microsoft Access database called Data
Warehouse, to facilitate user defined queries and reports. The plant was in the process of rolling
out this system in all the value streams. The IT group was responsible for this rollout and system
level customization. The Process Engineering group created and maintained the line specific
processes and work instructions (process sheet) in SFDM.
The sequence of operations in the assembly process was defined in SFDM along with each
operation's standard time and work instructions. This sequence of operations was called a
Router. The system tracked the operational and financial metrics in building the part based on the
part's router. The manufacturing engineer defined the router and evolving work instructions
based on formally issued Change Notifications. The process engineering group was responsible
for creating and maintaining the router in SFDM.
When an operator, assigned to a particular operation, logged into SFDM, the system displayed
all the parts (SFC numbers) to be processed in that operation. When the operator performed the
operation on the part(s), he/she selected the SFC number(s) in the system and marked the
operation as complete. These parts then proceeded to the next operation in the router.
The decision to purchase SFDM was made by the Raytheon division in Dallas, TX. They
introduced this product to Andover. Though the IT group in Andover was trained to implement
SFDM, most of the SFDM expertise resides in Dallas. Both SFDM and Data warehouse are
managed and maintained by the IT group in Dallas. Because Andover did not make the decision
to buy SFDM, a certain amount of a "Not Invented Here" feeling was prevalent among the users.
SFDM was introduced to this assembly line when the line was built. All the shop floor personnel
attended the basic SFDM training. However, the operators did not undergo job/product specific
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training. The assembly area had no rules or standards for data entry. Because of this, the data was
not entered in a consistent manner. A lot of time was spent on collecting data, but not in a form
that was easy to analyze. Another problem was a lack of SFDM understanding. Because the
users were not trained to perform their jobs, they had different interpretations of the same SFDM
reports (even basic ones like Production report that is used everyday for making decisions).
Serious data integrity issues arose because of the following practice:
" When there was a change in the router, the operation names were also changed, even if the
work done in the operation did not change. This was because process engineering wanted to
have the operation names in sequence (e.g.: ASYI, ASY2, ASY3 instead of ASYl, ASY3).
* However, when the work done in a particular operation changed, the operations were not
renamed.
The following example illustrates both these problems. The work done in ASY2 was split for
some of it to be done in ASYI and rest of it to be done later in the process. Though the work
done in ASYI increased (because of the part that was included from ASY2), the name of the
operation was not changed. If one looked at the time taken for ASYl over a period of time, the
plot would show the time increasing but does not show the reason unless a considerable amount
of time is spent to find out the date when exactly the operation has changed. This split also
resulted in scrapping the ASY2 operation. Because the rule dictated that the operations had to be
in sequence, all the operations after ASY2 were renamed, so ASY3 became ASY2, ASY4
became ASY3 and so on. If one wanted to analyze, for e.g. ASY4, historic data would give the
wrong information because work done in the past in ASY4 was completely different from what
was currently being done.
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The low volume culture was evident in the implementation of SFDM as well. This kind of
implementation practice was particularly challenging for this line not only because of the high
volumes involved, but also because of the frequency of changes to the router. Data integrity
issues may not be as critical in a low volume environment as they are in a high volume
environment because the data can be easily verified by visual inspection. During the internship
period, the router was revised almost every month. In summary, the implementation did not
allow for analysis or decision-making based on historic data. Also, if manufacturing introduced
any process improvements, it was not possible to compare metrics like yield or time taken with
historic data.
The lack of a complete understanding of SFDM resulted in wrong expectations. At one point,
while evaluating the cleaning operation for ribbon bond process, some parts went through an
aqua wash and the others went through plasma cleaning. But there was only one CLEAN
operation in SFDM to log both of these operations. Unfortunately, manufacturing expected
SFDM to keep track of these separately and in the end there was no way to track which parts
went through which of these operations. Because of this, one of the team member's hand-written
notes identifying the performed operations became the basis for making one of the most
important process decisions.
There was no accountability for the router implementation. Though manufacturing engineers
design the router on paper, they did not approve the SFDM router before process engineering
released it to production. Sometimes the released routers had errors. This can be attributed to two
reasons:
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1. When the process engineering group received a request to create or revise a router, the
work was assigned to any available process engineer. There were no specific process
engineers assigned to the value streams. This was because the management believed that
common procedures had to be used across the factory, so they didn't have to allocate
people based on the value stream. So, no one in the group understood the specific
requirements for a given value stream.
This practice worked well when all the value streams produced similar types/volumes of
products. However, because this particular assembly line was different from the other
ones due to its high volume nature, the common procedures did not address the specific
needs for this line.
2. Once the router was created, manufacturing engineers did not see it till it was in
production - the people who know and use the router did not get to approve it. The
manufacturing people recognized this and wanted to be a part of the approval process but
they were not willing to take the initiative to change the existing process.
Once a router was in production it was impossible to correct it because parts would have been
built per this router. Unfortunately no one seemed to realize the effects of this because they were
not using the data for any analysis.
The contract with the customer required Raytheon to deliver specified quality charts periodically.
The Statistical Quality Control group created these charts. This group was located in a different
part of the building and was unaware of these data integrity problems with SFDM.
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All these problems became visible because the internship introduced and provided tools for
electronic gathering of metrics. This resulted in hiring a SFDM expert for two months to address
most of the data integrity issues.
The internship recommended special guidelines to the Process Engineering group, to address the
needs of the microwave value stream. Following these guidelines would preserve historic data to
facilitate data analysis for high volume manufacturing. The management agreed to use these
guidelines and they incorporated these into the process development's SFDM guidelines that all
their process engineers refer to.
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6 CHALLENGES
The manufacturing area operated in a fire-fighting mode. The culture encouraged people to
"work harder" instead of "work smarter". Because the people were busy with fire-fighting, they
did not have the time to implement long term improvements.
Overcoming the conventional mindset - pushing product thorough the line and building as much
as possible to fully utilize the manpower - was the biggest challenge during the internship. It
took a considerable amount of time and many conversations with the manufacturing personnel to
make them understand that "pulling" rather than "pushing" the product through the line was
better for the long term. Though they understood this on a theoretical level, it was never the
"right" time to start the pull system, because of the fire-fighting mode and the pressure to show
immediate results. The new layout provided the impetus to switch to the pull system.
The other challenge to implement the necessary changes was the status-quo attitude of the
people. In the LFM thesis33 , The Soft Side of the Toyota Production System is the Hard Side,
Johnson describes this type of culture as a culture of "Reliance on the problem solver". He
distinguishes between workers and problem solvers. He contends that in this culture, problem
solvers due to special characteristics like charisma, status and authority have a distinct advantage
to overcome the barriers to solve problems.
The research identified two types of people. The first type of people are those who do not
challenge the status-quo because they are not aware that there is a better way of doing things.
3 Johnson, Brent M.; The Soft Side of the Toyota Production System is the Hard Side, LFM Thesis, June 1998
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They accept the situation they are in and work hard in their daily jobs. The example of the PC
support person spending four hours per day counting parts on the floor is a good example of
working hard instead of ensuring data integrity so they can get the data from the SFDM system.
The other type are those who do not challenge the status-quo even though they know better ways
to improve the current state. But these people do not feel empowered to take the necessary steps
to make the change. This is because either they think that it is not their problem or they perceive
the process to be too bureaucratic. This is illustrated by the example of manufacturing not taking
any steps to approve the SFDM router before it was released to production.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
The internship succeeded in making the management aware of the differences between managing
a high volume line versus a low volume line. Benchmarking within Raytheon helped in
introducing some of the best practices to this line. The new processes implemented by the
internship are being adopted by other assembly lines in the cell as well.
Figure 10 shows the throughput by operation in June 2003. The throughput from the initial
operations was significantly more than the throughput from the last few operations. The technical
issues with the ribbon bond operation resulted in this, causing high levels of WIP before the
ribbon bond operation. This kind of line management led to reworking of 700 parts after the
technical issues were resolved.
Throughput by Operation (Jun 2003)
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Figure 10: Throughput by Operation (Jun 2003)
In contrast, Figure 11 shows that the front of the line is more coordinated. The end of the line
had high throughput because these operations processed the backlog from previous months.
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Throughput by Operation (Nov 2003)
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Figure 11: Throughput by Operation (Nov 2003)
The success of the efforts to improve communication using visual controls is evident from
Raytheon's initiative to display these on TV monitors.
The tools provided to improve the production plan execution, like the "Daily Work Plan" are
also being widely used and have led to better line coordination (Figure 11). The Gate-based line
management is being used by other programs as well. The internship did not have the
opportunity to evaluate the pull system implementation due to material shortages.
The program met its schedule and delivered the product on budget, despite the areas of
improvement addressed in this thesis. But this was achieved with a lot of fire-fighting and
unplanned overtime to accommodate the increasing target rates.
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8 FUTURE WORK
8.1 CN Implementation in Manufacturing
Due to the number of technical problems during manufacturing, Engineering had to introduce
frequent changes. They recognized the fact that these Change Notifications (CN) have to be
processed faster than the CNs for other programs. So, they created a new change approval
process called "Rapid CN approval" to approve critical CNs in this program. However, once
engineering approved a CN, it fell in the same queue with CNs for all the other programs,
sometimes taking up to two weeks for manufacturing to receive the CN. This resulted in
Manufacturing having little or no time to prepare or plan, for the required changes.
The research mapped the current state of this CN implementation process in Manufacturing after
Engineering approval. The project identified key stakeholders and brought them together to
improve this process to reduce the two week cycle time. This effort is now covered by
Raytheon's Radar Affordability project.
8.2 Calculating Sigma by Operation
The internship also started a Raytheon Six SigmaTm initiative to calculate sigma by operation.
Calculating sigma by operation will help in identifying operations that need improvement. This
will also help in calculating yields by operation to achieve continually improved line
coordination. This initiative was handed over to the Cell Leader.
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8.3 Surface Radar Procurement Strategy
During the term of the internship, there were many instances when the manufacturing line
starved due to lack of material either from internal or external suppliers. Line coordination and
Lean manufacturing cannot be achieved with these frequent, unplanned events. The internship
also suggested that Raytheon sponsor an LFM internship to streamline their procurement
strategy. With its commitment to Lean manufacturing, Andover site is sponsoring this
internship 4 in 2004.
8.4 Transforming Data to Information
The present LFM internships identified and escalated the problem with capturing too much shop
floor level data that is not useful. One example of this problem is the non-conformance (defect)
data that is entered into SFDM. The data collected makes analysis on types or frequency of a
certain type of defect practically impossible. The operators spend more time entering this defect
data than they actually spend inspecting the part. These internships highlighted the importance of
collecting information versus data.
This effort is also a candidate project area for LFM interns in 2004".
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3 https://Ifmsdm.mit.edu
3 https://lfmsdm.mit.edu
Exhibit A
Raytheon 6S Checklist
ENTER 5, 3, or 1 to the yellow SCORE area
ItemCate-orv
Rank 5 points; No problems
found
Rank 3 points: 1 - 2 problems
found
Rank 1: 3 or more problems
observed
A B C Comments Score
SAFETY Machinery - Are safety guards and switches in place and visible? 5 3 1
Total 15 points Aisles - Are aisles clear and emergency exits signs in place? 5 3 1
Reference Electrical - Are there potential electrical hazards (damaged cables, 5 3 1
document cables on floor, emergency shut-off's not available,etc.)?
Alarms - Are all safety alarms and indicators working and visible? 5 3 1
Visual Aids/Warning Labels - Are labels and warnings legible? 5 3 1
Environmental Hazards - Are chemicals properly stored? 5 3 1
Fire - Does area have fire emergency plans and received training? 5 3 1
Personal - Are area requirements established and being used? 5 3 1
SORT/Sift Have all unnecessary Bench and POU items been identified? 5 3 1
Total 20 points Have unnecessary Bench and POU items been tagged? 5 3 1
Have unnecessary Bench and POU items been dispositioned (per 5 3 1
a removal process)?
Have unnecessary items been removed (in a timely manner)? 5 3 1
STORE/Sort Bench Area - Are materials, tools, fixtures, documentation properly 5 3 1
identified/labeled?
Total 20 points Bench Area - Are materials, tools, fixtures, documentation put- 5 3 1
away correctly after use?
P.O.U. - Are materials, tools, fixtures, documentation properly 5 3 1
identified/labeled?
P.O.U - Are materials, tools, fixtures, documentation put-away 5 3 1
correctly after use?
Bench/P.O.U - Are all stations clearly identified with signs? 5 3 1
SHINE/Sweep
Total 15 points
Are Bench, P.O.U. & packaging material kept clean?
Is equipment (test stations, ovens, etc.) kept clean?
Are cleaning materials properly identified and easily accessible?
Are cleaning guidelines and schedules easily visible?
5 3 1
5 3 1
5 3 1
5 3 1
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Are demarcation lines clean and unbroken?
Is equipment, benches, and general area painted/refurbished to
look as new?
Are waste bins overflowing?
STANDARDIZE/
Sustain
Total 20 points
SUCCESS/
Self Discipline
Total 10 points
Is there a radar chart, 6s checklist in the area?
is there a run rule for identifying/removing unnecessary items?
Is there a run rule for cleaning the bench and P.O.U.?
Is there a 6s schedule?
Are there identification run rules for bins, racks, signs, etc.
Are there "put-away" run rules for chemicals, calibrated tools,
standard tools?
Are ergonomic run rules being followed?
Is there a 6S champion and run rules for inputs to the champion?
Is the 6s achievement/celebration criteria known?
Are previous actions closed in a timely manner? If not, has it been
escalated to upper management? Are before / after photos
visible?
Is the radar chart improving?
Does area manager regularly encourage and explain 6s for the
area?
Is success openly celebrated and the events recorded?
Does area manager give rewards for participation in 6S?
5 3 1
5 3 1
5 3 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
U
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
5 1
LIIILIILIZ'Em'
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Exhibit B
Weekly Progress Report (June 2003)
CUM
5/3 6/1 6/2 6/2
W/E 0 6/6 3 0 7
170 210 230 250
AIMS 1 1901 1 1 1
133 178 201 223
0 7 1562 7 2 7
618
equi 707
A v equiv
130
DTM 8
Recover 106 129
Y 393 618 843 8 3
Curr
ent
Rate
Goal
of 45
Current Week Cum Outlook Equivalent Units:
800
CUM
Month APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
AIMS 901 1701 2501 3222 3222 3222
0 462 1337 2237 2962 3222 3222
A 0 0
DTM -901 1701
Recov 618
ery 0 equiv 1293 2148 3168 3222
Req'd
Daily
Rate 45 45 50
6 3 2
11
7 0
AS RINSPE - AS TST TST INSPE ASY FINALTS FINI COMPL
OPER Y6 CT2 Y7 1 2 TST3 TST4 CT3 8 T SP ETE
AVAL 44 7 22 129 57 83 39 128 8 80 188 46
cUM 831 787 780 758 629 572 489 450 322 314 234 46
Rework
Insert 1 2 8 42 0 19 0 1 0 16 4
Mdays
to MIR
ENGINE
ER
REVIE
W
RACK
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RACK
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RWK
WTG
MATERI
AL
WTG
REWOR
K
5
4
2
24
105
140
Mdays
to MIR 12 10 9
AS AS ASY INSPE CLE RBNBO ASY INSPEC RBO
C/B OPER KIT Y1 Y2 3 ASY4 CT1 AN ND1 5 T2 ND
1355350 AVAL 152 10 54 70 40 162 180 35 36 79
9-1 172 172 149
TRIMM CUM 7 7 7 1487 1433 1363 1323 1161 981 946 910
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Exhibit C
Report Based on Gates
ILU
Total P z o Z 4
3100 Hrs I _: _ - I E. a. 0
MFG GATE GATE
METRICS GATE I GATE 2 GATE 3 4 GATE 5 6
Average Daily Completes Since 8/7:
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
STANDARDS 5.4 4 1 7 1 2 1 3 5 3 4 7 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
EST OPER
K-F 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
EST 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
FACTORHR 9.5 7 3 3 2 1 3 6 0 3 5 6 9 1 2 2 4 3 2 2
GATE HRS 9.5 2.6 2.0 3.3 0.3 1.1 0.2
CUM
COMPLETE 2530 2366 2042 1366 1398 1146
BAL RADAR
1 570 734 1058 1734 1702 1954
EST.
COMP DATE 2-Sep 9-Sep 16-Sep 22-Sep 26-Sep 30-Sep
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Exhibit D
Key Performance Metrics
Apart from the metrics identified for visual controls, the internship identified the following
metrics to monitor.
WIP
* Aging WIP > 30 days gets flagged
* Out of flow WIP - what % of total WIP is in rework?
" WIP as a total
Cycle time
* Daily Dynamic cycle time (WIP/shipped for a day)
* Total cycle time (days in the factory)
* Value added cycle time (theoretical cycle time)
Labor
" Overtime
* Labor Productivity - Units Produced divided by labor hours (all hours worked, including
overtime).
Quality
" First pass yield
* DPU = Total number of defects identified on all units/ number of units
* Operation DPMO (Sigma by operation)
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Exhibit E
Visual Controls
This exhibit shows a few of the visual controls identified by the internship. Production meeting
agenda, Production meeting run rules, the Issues log and Production run rules are some of the
other visual controls not shown here.
WIP Charts
The WIP charts display the current WIP for each of the identified "Gates". The example in the
following chart shows the WIP in Gate1. Operators are allowed to work only on operations that
have a current WIP less than the Maximum WIP (buffer limit).
WIP in Gate I o Current WIP
* Max WIP
30
-- - - - - ----8
- -
ASY3 ASY4 INSPECTI
Current and Max WIP levels for each of the operations in Gate]
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Throughput Charts
There are two types of Throughput charts - (1) Yesterday's throughput and (2) Weekly
cumulative throughput, at each of the "Gates". The throughput at a "Gate" is the throughput from
the last operation in that "Gate".
Yesterday's Thruput Actual
- Goal
35
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25-
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5
-3- 0 0
Gate IA Gatel Gate2 Gate3 Gate4 MIR
Previous day's throughput against the goal for each of the Gates
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Exhibit F
Daily Work Plan
Max Current
Operation WIP WIP Gap
ASY1 30 215 (185)
ASY2 30 18 12
ASY3 40 35 5
INSPECT1 20 11 9
ASY4
ASY5
INSPECT2
ASY6
AqY7
80'
80
20
27
27
6
6
20
80
ASY10
INSPECT4
ASY11
60
30
20t
20
28
13
38:
11
72
98
223
27
52
67
(18:
16
(4R
(7
150
63
21
35
6
11
Today's Req
Req Rate # Ops
72 60 7
65 60 3
'9 60 12
12 60 3
27 60 1
42 60 1
76 60 2
15 60 1
60 0
60 0
S60 4
60 0
92 60 1
2, 75 1
74 60 1
74 60 13
69 60 4
27 60 1
61 63 1
38 60 1
TEST4 20 56 (3(
20L42 (2
Start working right away
(Need > half daily req)
Can wait to work on these
(Need < half daily req)
Don't work
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Exhibit G
Sign on the Racks
The following figure is an example of the signs for the racks carrying input buffers.
INSPECT4 Max.WIP20
5 5 5 5
Parts Parts Parts Parts
Parts for Engineering Review
Parts for Rework
Rule: Once all blue spaces are filled TST2 must stop!
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